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European market integration for gas?
Volume flexibility and political risk
Frank Asche, Petter Osmundsen, Ragnar Tveterås
Abstract
Long-term take-or-pay contracts regulating gas exports to the Continent are described
and analyzed. We thereafter examine whether the German gas market is integrated. Time
series of Norwegian, Dutch and Russian gas export prices to Germany in 19901998 are
examined. Cointegration tests show that that the different border prices for gas to Germany
move proportionally over time, indicating an integrated gas market. We find differences in
mean prices, with Russian gas being sold at prices systematically lower than Dutch and
Norwegian gas. Among the explanatory factors for price discrepancies are differences in
volume flexibility swingŽ . and perceived political risk.  2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All
rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we are interested in the degree of market integration in the
European natural gas market, and how this is influenced by the contractual
relationships between buyers and sellers. In our empirical work we focus on
German import from the Netherlands, Norway and Russia. Germany is a natural
candidate for a case study since it is the largest national gas market on the
Continent, has a central position with respect to the distribution of gas across the
European market, and is one of the few markets where three of the largest
producers all supply considerable quantities. Germany is also an interesting case in
light of the EU Gas Directive, since the liberalization of the German natural gas
market will have a major influence on the development in the rest of Europe
Theory predicts that in an integrated market, prices on homogenous products
from different suppliers should move in the same direction, and price differentials
should only be present if there are differences in transportation costs or quality.
However, the explanation behind price discrepancies may be somewhat more
complicated in the European natural gas market. Natural gas is overwhelmingly
sold on complex long-term contracts that have a number of features that may
influence the contract price, and hence lead to price variations across contracts.
Furthermore, there may be elements of political risk that can influence relative
prices. We explain how the long term take-or-pay gas sales contracts trade off the
sellers’ need to secure supply before sinking large irreversible investments into
extraction and transportation facilities, and the buyers’ need for natural gas prices
to be responsive to developments in interfuel competition. Thereafter, we examine
the link between contract structure and observed market prices.
We investigate the degree of market integration in the German market by
examining the relationship between the import prices from the three main suppli-
ers, the Netherlands, Norway and Russia. Since the prices appear to be non-
stationary, cointegration analysis will be the empirical tool.1 We will also examine
the underlying determinants of our empirical results, particularly on the impact of
the contract structure. An analysis of the long term take-or-pay gas export
contracts is given, and the export strategies of the Netherlands, Norway and Russia
are examined in relation to our empirical findings.2
Several empirical aspects of European gas market integration have received 
scant attention by researchers. However, the basic methodological approach has 
been used in several studies of US gas markets ŽDoane and Spulber, 1994; Walls, 
1994; Serletis and Herbert, 1999.. We will use some recent development in 
methods and theory to increase the informational content of these tests. Since we 
use the Johansen test Johansen, 1988Ž . when testing for cointegration, we can also 
test parameter restrictions on the cointegration parameters. In this context it is of 
particular interest to test for the Law of One Price LOPŽ .. Moreover, Asche et al. 
1999Ž . have shown that when the Law of One Price holds, the generalized 
composite commodity theorem of Lewbel 1996Ž . will hold. Hence, the market 
integration tests can also contain information about whether the goods in question 
can be aggregated. Finally, in market integration analysis, the so-called 
proportionality coefficient has received little attention. Because of the importance of 
long-term contracts, also these parameters are of interest since they contain 
information about how different the prices are.
1 Recently, a number of studies have used cointegration analysis to investigating relationships
Ž . Ž .between prices. Examples related to energy markets are Doane and Spulber 1994 , Sauer 1994 , Walls
Ž . Ž . Ž .1994 , Gjølberg and Johnsen 1999 and Serletis and Herbert 1999 .
2 For a more general presentation of the export strategies of these countriesas well as Algeriasee
Ž . Ž .Mabro and Wybrew-Bond 1999 and Stoppard 1996 .
Fig. 1. The value chain in the German natural gas market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a presentation of the
German natural gas market. In Section 3 the features of gas sales contracts are
analyzed. Section 4 presents the market integration theory and test methodology
that we utilize in our empirical analysis. The empirical analysis of import prices is
undertaken and explanations for price differences are given in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2. The German natural gas market
Natural gas has an increasing share of the German energy market, with a market
share of 21% in 1998.3 In 1998 natural gas imports had a 79% share of the total
supply of 83 Bcm to the German market, with domestic producers supplying the
remaining quantities. Russia was the largest exporter to the German market, with a
35% share of total supply in 1998. The Netherlands provided 19% of total supply,
Norway 19% and DenmarkUK 3%.
The German market has the most complex structure of all the markets in
continental Europe. An important reason for this is that all agents along the value
chain, from wellhead producers to local distribution companies, sell to end-users.
Thus, Fig. 1 depicts only the main distribution channels for natural gas in the
German market.
Ž .In 1995, 18 transmissionmerchant companies Ferngasgesellschaften were oper-
Ž .ating on the German market IEA, 1998, pp. 168169 . Only seven of the
transmission companies imported gas in 1996. The other companies bought gas
3 Measured in oil equivalents.
from other transmission companies or domestic producers. Ruhrgas is the domi-
nant importer, with 61% of total imports in 1996 Maissonier, 1997Ž .. It purchases
gas from all the three major export countries supplying the German market. The
second largest importer, BEB, owned by Shell and Exxon, had an 11% import
share, followed by VNG Ž10% ,. Thyssen Gas 8%Ž . and Wingas 7%Ž ..
The transmission companies supplied gas to 673 regional and local distribution
Ž .companies LDCs , and also to large end-users. Only a minority of the LDCs are
pure gas distribution companies. Most of these supply electricity or water in
addition to gas.
The ownership structure in the German natural gas market implies that there
are several agents having vested interests in several parts of the value chain. Major
Žinternational oil companies have ownership interests both in gas extraction in
.Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway and in importtransmission companies in
Germany. The transmission companies often have a complicated owner structure.
This applies in particular to the largest transmission company, Ruhrgas. Among the
Ž .owners of Ruhrgas are major oil companies BPAmoco, Shell, Exxon and manu-
Ž .facturing companies e.g. Mannesmann, Thyssen-Krupp . Oil companies also have
considerable owner interests in several other transmission companies. For example,
BEB is a joint venture between Shell and Exxon. Furthermore, transmission
companies have large ownership interests in other transmission companies. Finally,
transmission companies may have ownership interests in regional and local dis-
tribution companies.
The transmission and merchant companies purchase gas on long-term take-or-pay
Ž .contracts 2025 years from producers abroad, and on depletion contracts from
Ž .German producers IEA, 1998, p. 175 . Hence, they carry the volume risk under
these contracts. The transmission companies try to reflect this in their sales
contracts with LDCs which are long-term, up to 1520 years, but normally do not
have take-or-pay obligations. Earlier, the LDCs were obliged to buy all their gas
from the merchant company. Recently, however, new contracts have been limited
to specified volumes and have allowed the LDCs to buy from alternative suppliers.
Contracts with large industrial users typically have a duration of 1015 years, and
normally have a take-or-pay clause. Contracts with power producers generally have
the same structure as contracts with industrial users.
German gas demand exhibits considerable fluctuation both on a monthly and
daily basis. In a typical year demand is roughly three times higher in the month
with the highest demand than in the month with the lowest demand. The peak
demand on a cold winter day may be roughly four times higher than on a warm
summer day.
Existing and planned pipeline capacity of the major producers is expected to be
larger than predicted demand in the coming years. Germany, in particular, is
expected to face a surplus supply of gas from the Netherlands, Norway and Russia
Ž .EJC, 1998 .
Industrial consumers have been among the main driving forces for a liberaliza-
tion of the German market. German industry has paid some of the highest gas
prices in Europe, and increased competition among energy suppliers would make
German manufacturing industries more competitive abroad.
In the early 1990s Wingas, a partnership between Russian Gazprom and the
BASF subsidiary Wintershall, entered the gas transmission and trading market.
This has led to a reduction in the prices of new long-term supply contracts,
Ž .according to EJC p. 1 . Because of the absence of third party access, Gazprom and
BASF were forced to build a huge transmission network. Wingas is now able to
compete for customers in large parts of Germany. It has been argued that
gas-to-gas competition has emerged in areas to which Wingas has extended its
Ž .transmission grid. IEA 1998, p. 8889 finds that gross margins has decreased in
transmission and increased in distribution following the increased competition at
the transmission level.
An obstacle to increased competition in Germany is the absence of full third-party
access to pipelines. Negotiated third-party access, which will give pipeline owners
considerable discretion, seems to be the regime for the coming years.
3. The gas sales contracts
In the case of Germany gas imports, negotiations were primarily undertaken
bilaterally between the three suppliersthe Netherlands, Norway, and
ŽRussiaand a consortium of gas buyers comprised by Ruhrgas, BEB a Shell
.Exxon joint venture and Thyssen Gas.
3.1. Contract design and negotiation issues
European import contracts have a number of detailed specifications on the gas
to be delivered. The natural gas is processed of the sellers to satisfy strict
requirements with respect to quality. The calorific value of the gas differs, e.g.
Norwegian and Russian natural gas in general has a higher calorific value than
Dutch gas. Thus, for comparability, contract prices are often listed in terms of
payment per calorific unit. In our data set prices are listed in USD per million Btu,
see Fig. 2,4 which means that the difference in calorific value is accounted for.
In regulating contracting volumes, the exporting and the importing companies
have conflicting interests. Since gas storage is expensive and in limited supply, the
importer would like to have flexibility with respect to volumes, thus being able to
adjust to changes in downstream demand. Demand fluctuates, especially over the
seasons, with a higher demand in Winter than in Summer. The exporters, however,
has to sink large irreversible investments in extraction, processing, and transporta-
tion facilities. Before doing so, they would like to have assurances that they will be
able to sell the gas over a considerable period of time, thus securing a return on
their investments. Also, to exploit the extraction, processing and transportation
4 Btu British thermal unit.
capacity, the seller would prefer to deliver a stable gas stream at maximum capacity
utilization. The exporter wouldbefore making large irreversible investments
prefer a specific price, a minimum price, or other types of price guarantees for the
entire period of delivery. The buyers, however, would like the gas price to be
responsive to the price of substitutes such as oil productsŽ ., so that they are able to
sell the gas.
Fig. 2. Import prices for natural gas from the Netherlands, Norway and Russia to Germany.
The challenging task for gas contract design is to trade-off these conflicting
interests with respect to volume and price. The exact contents of these contracts
are secret, but the general contract structure is common knowledge in the gas
industry. The major part of gas export to Germany in the period 19901998 was
Ž .sold on long term take-or-pay contracts, see Brautaset et al. 1998 . In these
contracts, the buyer agrees to receive a certain volume of gas per year or,
alternatively, to pay for the part of this gas volume that it does not like to receive.
At the same time, the buyer has an option to take out more gas than these
minimum annual amounts, thus conveying flexibility. Substantial volume flexibility
is also available on a daily basis. The contracts specify two types of reference
Ž . Ž .volumes, Daily Contract Quantity DCQ and Annual Contract Quality ACQ .
The annual flexibility is regulated by an interval around the ACQ, e.g. the buyer is
committed to take or pay 8595% of ACQ, and may have specific options on
annual volumes exceeding ACQ. As for the daily flexibility and commitments, the
buyer may be committed to take or pay 4050% of DCQ, and the seller may be
committed to deliver up to 110% of DCQ. Additional flexibility for the buyer is
provided by the right to receive at a later time gas that has been paid but not taken
Make Up GasŽ ., and the right to reduce future delivery if gas take exceeds the
commitments in some years Carry Forward GasŽ ..
The current price on gas delivered according to the long term take-or-pay
contracts is determined by a price formula. The formula links the current gas price
to the price of relevant energy substitutes, thus continuously securing the buyer
competitive terms.5 The price formula consists of two parts, a constant basis price
Ž .fixed term and an escalation supplement linking the gas price to alternative forms
Ž . 6of energy variable term . Examples of alternative energy commodities used in
pricing formulas for natural gas are light fuel oil, coal, and electricity. Usually a
Ž . 7combination of alternatives are used for escalation purposes weighted average .
Ž .The basis price which is not subject to subsequent price revision reflects the
parties’ evaluation of the value of the gas at the time of entering the contract. Each
of the alternative energy commodities are assigned a certain weight in the escala-
tion element, reflecting the competitive situation between natural gas and the
substitute. The price change of each energy commodity is multiplied by an energy
conversion factor, to make the substitute and natural gas commensurable. There-
after, the individual escalation terms are multiplied by impact factors, i.e. the
change in the price of the substitute is not fully reflected in the gas price. A typical
price formula is given by
Ž . Ž .P P   AE  AE EK  1Ý0 j j j0 A E j j
j
where P is the gas price, P is the basis price,  is the weight in the escalation0 j
Ž . Ž .element for substitute j with   1 , AEj AE is the price change forÝ j j0
j
Ž .substitute j actual minus historic price , EK is an energy conversion factor,A E j
and  is the impact factor for price changes in substitute j.j
The impact factors are typically high, e.g. 0.85 or 0.90. Thus, natural gas prices in
these contracts are highly responsive to price changes in substitutes, and exhibits a
high volatility. This implies that the producers are carrying a large fraction of the
price risk. Price adjustments for substitutes are based on the difference between
current and historic prices. Current prices are calculated as average prices for a
reference period, ranging from 3 to 9 months. This gives reliable price data and
implies a certain lag in the price adjustments. Under certain conditions and at
certain time intervals the parties may demand price revisions. The basis for such
Ž .renegotiations is that outside the control of the contracting parties the value of
gas has changed substantiallyrelative to the available substitutesin the buyer’s
home country.
5 ŽAdjustments in the gas price is not automatically imposed, though, but by periodical monthly or
.quarterly recalculations of the contract price by using the price formula and updated prices on
substitutes.
6 This is the basic structure on most gas contracts in Europe.
7 Some contracts also contain adjustments for inflation.
3.2. Flexibility and regularity of supply
The giant on-land Groningen field, twice the size of Norway’s offshore Troll 
discovery, has a substantial swing capacity. After the 1973 oil crisis, the Dutch
 authorities decided to develop the countries’ smaller fields. The companies 
received higher pay for production from smaller reserves, thus leaving much of 
the Groningen gas in the ground. This policy still prevails. Only half of the 
estimated 3000 billion cubic meters has been recovered. The Groningen thus 
guarantees security of supply and a considerable swing capacity. To ensure 
sufficient future peak winter capacity, three underground gas stores have been 
developed.
Approximately 10% of natural gas consumed in Europe comes from Norwegian
North Sea fields, and the market share is to expand in the coming years. Norwegian
gas suppliers achieved virtually 100% delivery reliability last year.8 The Norwegian
gas transport network is highly flexible and can cope with the shut-down of
individual fields. Moreover, various fields, e.g. Troll, Sleipner and Ekofisk canif
they are run at full capacitycompensate if one field drops out. The Troll field is
the backbone of Norwegian gas supplies, acting as the swing supplier. In addition, a
quantity of Norwegian gas is stored at Etzel in Germany, to ensure flexibility in the
receiving system.
The very long supply distances for Russian natural gas imply that excess pipeline
capacity to supply swing services would be very costly. Long supply lines may also
involve a risk with respect to regularity. This risk is partly technical and partly
political. As for the latter, Russia is strongly dependent on a steady stream of hard
currency from the export of natural gas. Stable gas supplies have therefore a high
priority, thus reducing the political risk. However, there is significant political risk
connected to the transit countries. For example, most Russian gas export to
Europe goes through Ukraine. Transport tariffs to Ukraine are paid in terms of
natural gas deliveries, where the Ukrainians themselves take out gas from the
export pipeline. The extent of this compensation has been subject to a more or less
continuous debate, and at times the Ukrainians have taken out more natural gas
than expected, leading to a lower pressure in the pipelines and a failure to reach
contract obligations. However, the buyers have been able to adjust the fall in
supply by making use of gas in storage, and they have been compensated for added
costs.
4. Price based test for market integration and aggregation
A number of market definitions are based on the relationship between prices.
Ž .For instance, Stigler 1969, p. 85 defines a market as ‘the area within which the
price of a good tends to uniformity, allowances being made for transportation
8 Ž .Norwegian Petroleum Diary, No. 4, NPD, 1999 .
costs’.9 Market definitions like this has led to an extensive literature testing for
market integration based on the relationship between prices. In international
markets, the prices must be compared in the same currency, and exchange rate
Ž .movements can therefore also play a part Richardson, 1978 . However, in primary
Ž .goods markets the price is often quoted in a single currency normally USD , and
even if this is not the case, one often assumes perfect exchange rate pass through,
and denote the prices in a common currency.10 Transportation costs and quality
differences can also be modeled explicitly, but are in most cases assumed to be
constant.
The basic relationship to be investigated when analyzing relationships between
prices is then
Ž .ln p   ln p 21 t 2 t
Ž .where  is a constant term the log of a proportionality coefficient that captures
transportation costs and quality differences and  gives the relationship between
the prices.11 If  0, there are no relationship between the prices, while if  1
the Law of One Price holds, and the relative price is constant. In this case the
goods in question are perfect substitutes. If  is different from zero but not equal
to one there is a relationship between the prices, but the relative price is not
Ž .constant, and the goods will be imperfect substitutes. Eq. 2 describes the situation
when prices adjust immediately. However, often there will be a dynamic adjustment
Žpattern. This can be accounted for by introducing lags of the two prices Ravallion,
.1986; Slade, 1986 . It should be noted here that even when dynamics are intro-
Ž .duced, the long-run relationship will have the same form as Eq. 2 .
There is also a close link between market integration and aggregation. If  1,
not only do the Law of One Price hold, but also the composite commodity theorem
Ž . Ž .of Hicks 1936 and Leontief 1936 . This criterion is the first criterion used for
aggregation in economics. It states that if prices of a group of goods move
proportionally over time, these goods can be represented by a single price and
quantity. A problem with the composite commodity theorem in empirical work is
that for the theorem to hold, the prices must be exactly identical. However, Lewbel
Ž .1996 provides an empirical useful generalization of the theorem that allows for
some deviations from proportionality.12 There are several ways to test for the
9 A similar definition, but where transportation costs are replaced by quality differences can be used
Ž .in product space Stigler and Sherwin, 1985 .
10 This might lead to a bias against a stable relationship between prices, since imperfect exchange
rate pass-through is then not accounted for.
11 In most analysis it is assumed that transportation costs and quality differences can be treated as
Ž .constant. However, this can certainly be challenged, see e.g. Goodwin et al. 1990 , since if the
transportation costs are not constant, this can cause rejections of the Law of One Price.
12 As always, there is some cost involved. Aggregates constructed using the generalized composite
commodity theorem cannot be used in welfare comparisons.
generalized commodity theorem. In a market integration context, a simple test is
Ž . 13whether the Law of One Price holds Asche et al., 1999 .
In most analyses, the proportionality coefficient does not receive much attention.
This is only natural, since it is the relationship between the prices that give us
information about the degree of market integration, and that is relevant for
aggregation. However, in out context, also the proportionality term is of interest, as
it holds information about the mean difference between the prices when the Law
of One Price holds. If the proportionality coefficient is equal to one, the constant
term  will be zero, and the two prices are identical except for stationary
deviations. If the proportionality coefficient is larger or less than one, or the
constant term  is larger or less than zero, there will be a price premium in one
direction. Hence, in our case, with identical products delivered at the same
location, a test of whether the constant term  is different from zero is a test for
the existence of a risk premium.
5. Empirical analysis
5.1. Empirical results
We now turn to the empirical analysis. At our disposition we had a data set of
monthly German import prices on natural gas from the Netherlands, Norway and
Russia for the period January 1990 to December 1997. Official publications of
German import prices are not available. Only average total import prices are
provided by government statistical agencies.14 In this study we rely on prices
Ž .compiled by the World Gas Intelligence Weekly WGI . These are shown in Fig. 2.
The data are collected from sources close to the buyers and sellers of natural gas,
and are supposed to provide a good estimate of the contract prices. It is, of course,
difficult to validate the reliability of the estimates. However, the fact that WGI
prices are used by major buyers and sellers in their market analysis, should give an
indication that the estimates are reasonably accurate.
Before a statistical analysis of the relationships can be carried out, we must
Žinvestigate the time series properties of the data. DickeyFuller tests Dickey and
.Fuller, 1979, 1981 were carried out for the price series. The lag length was chosen
as the highest significant lag. Six lags were used for all prices in levels, and five for
the first differences. All prices are found to be non-stationary, but stationary in
Ž .first differences Table 1 . These results are independent of the selected lag length.
Hence, cointegration analysis is the appropriate tool when investigating the rela-
tionships between the prices.
The first test we perform is a multivariate Johansen test on the three prices. Six
13 One should note that this test is more restrictive than necessary, as the theorem might hold even if
the Law of One Price is rejected.
14 See, e.g. the monthly average total import prices provided by the International Energy Agency in
the publication ‘Energy Prices & Taxes’.
Table 1
Dickey Fuller tests
Variable Price levels First differences
With constant With trend With constant With trend
 Russia 2.246 2.649 4.195 4.025
 Netherlands 1.696 2.263 4.464 4.362
 Norway 1.838 2.154 4.014 3.768
 Indicates significant at a 1% level and  indicates significant at a 5% level. Critical values are at
Ž .a 5% level with constant 2.893 and with trend 3.451 MacKinnon, 1991 .
lags seems to be sufficient to model the short-run dynamics, as LM-tests for
autocorrelation up to the 12th order gives the following test statistics with P-values
Ž .in parentheses: in the equation for Russian gas, 1.332 0.229 ; for Dutch gas, 1.365
Ž . Ž . 150.212 ; and for Norwegian gas, 1.575 0.128 . The results from the cointegration
test are reported in Table 2. Both the max and the trace test indicate that there
are two cointegration vectors, and hence one common stochastic trend. When we
test for LOP, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that this holds. The test is
2Ž .distributed as  2 and the test statistic is 1.771 with a P-value of 0.412. However,
when we also test whether there are no systematic differences in the price levels,
2Ž .this hypothesis is clearly rejected. The test is distributed as  2 and the test
statistic is 20.396 with a P-value of 0.0004. These results indicate that the gas from
the three suppliers compete closely in the same market, as the prices move
proportionally over time, but at different price levels. Moreover, the degree of
market integration is so high that the generalized composite commodity theorem of
Ž .Lewbel 1996 holds. Hence, gas from the three suppliers can be aggregated into a
single commodity with a single price.
In a system with n variables and n 1 cointegration vectors, one can always
Žnormalize the system so that one has n 1 pairwise relationships Johansen and
.Juselius, 1992 . Hence, bivariate tests can in this case in principle provide the same
information as a multivariate test. However, bivariate test also allow us to focus on
each relationship separately. We will here utilize this to further investigate the
Table 2
Multivariate Johansen test
H :rank P Max test Critical value 5% Trace test Critical value 5%0
 P 0 28.23 22.0 52.13 34.9
 P 1 17.71 15.7 23.9 20.0
P 2 6.19 9.2 6.19 9.2
 Indicates significant at a 1% level and  indicates significant at a 5% level.
15 The tests are distributed as F .12,53
different relationships between the three prices. In particular, we are interested in
the nature of the difference between the prices. However, a problem is that there
are more potential pairs they uniquely identified cointegration vectors.16 In our
case we have three potential pairs, of which only two are linearly independent.
However, since the theory gives us no guidance about which price to normalize
upon, we estimate all three potential pairs even though one of them is redundant.
The results are provided in Table 3. As expected, given that we found two
cointegration vectors in the multivariate test, each of the bivariate tests indicates
one cointegration vector. Furthermore, the LOP holds in all relationships, as we
would expect since it holds in the system. To shed some light on the magnitudes of
the constant term, we have included the estimated constant terms when the LOP
are imposed in Table 3. As one can see, the difference is substantially less between
Dutch and Norwegian gas than in any of the relationships with Russian gas. It is
therefore not too surprising that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
prices of Dutch and Norwegian gas are equal. However, we can reject both the
hypothesis that the price of Dutch and Russian and Norwegian and Russian gas is
equal. The negative constant terms imply that the price of Russian gas is systemati-
cally lower than the price of Dutch and Norwegian gas. One can find the
proportionality coefficient by taking the anti-log of the constant terms. This implies
that the price of Russian gas on average is 83.5% of the price of Dutch gas and
87.8% of the price of Norwegian gas.
5.2. Explaining price differences
The empirical analysis indicates that despite the existence of a well integrated
market for gas in Germany, there are systematic differences in the price levels.
Russian gas is sold at consistently lower prices than Dutch and Norwegian gas.
Since the gas prices move proportionally over time, the price discrepancy is in the
Ž .basis price fixed term of the long term take-or-pay contracts.
A plausible explanation to the observed price differences is that they reflect
different product attributes with respect to the flexibility of supply. The much
longer transport distances make it much more expensive for the Russians to offer
Ž .volume flexibility swing , since this requires excess capacity in the pipelines. Swing
services is can be provided at lower costs by suppliers that are situated close to the
market, i.e. Norway andin particularThe Netherlands. Volume flexibility is an
important product attribute for the buyers that are facing fluctuating demand,
implying differences in the willingness to pay. Our findings are that the natural gas
is more expensive the closer the supplier is to the market. This is consistent with
the fact that longer pipelines make it more expensive to offer swing services. To
our knowledge, the gas supply contracts with The Netherlands specify the highest
level of swing. Norway gas supplies to Germany are provided with a fair amount of
swing, whereas the Russians supply a steady amount of gas.
16 Ž .See Asche et al. 1999 for a discussion of this issue.
Table 3
Bivariate Johansen tests for cointegration and LOP
a cŽ .Variables H :rank P Max test Trace test LOP Constant term with LOP and no price AR 120
bthe LOP imposed difference
  Ž . Ž . Ž .Netherlands and P 0 19.55 27.48 0.008 0.929 0.003 0.555 0.757 1.612 0.113
Ž . Ž .Norway P 1 7.92 7.92 0.221 0.638 1.226 0.287
  Ž . Ž .Netherlands and P 0 24.39 29.11 0.307 0.018 16.119 0.0003 1.809 0.067
Ž . Ž .Russia P 1 4.72 4.72 0.579 1.004 0.457
  Ž . Ž .Norway and P 0 17.65 27.02 0.013 8.573 0.013 1.779 0.073
Ž .Russia P 1 8.026 8.026 0.803 0.645
 Indicates significant at a 1% level and  indicates significant at a 5% level. Critical values at a 5% level is 15.7 and 9.2, respectively, for the Max test
and 20.0 and 9.2 for the Trace test. All numbers in parentheses are P-values.
a The test for the Law of One Price is distributed as 2 with 1 degree of freedom.
b The test for the Law of One Price and price equality is distributed as 2 with 2 degrees of freedom.
c Ž .AR 12 is a LM-test against autocorrelation up to the 12th order and is distributed as F12,59.
Gas sales contracts to Germany from the three export countries were entered
into at different points of time. Price differences may thus partly reflect differences
in price expectations in different time periods.
The gas prices we analyze for the period 19901998 are based on long-term
contracts, many of which were entered into in the beginning of the 1980s or earlier.
ŽAt his time there was a strong focus on security of supply of energy as strategic
.commodities , i.e. net importing countries wanted to reduce technical and political
supply risk. Due to the latter, the buyers adapted a policy of buying gas from
several sources. In addition to the building of gas stores and the presence of dual
burner capacity, European gas importing countries preferred to have several
sources of gas deliveries to secure the supply. Thus, the Germans were willing to
pay a gas price that made it possible to develop new Norwegian gas fields, in order
to increase the security of supply. Price differences may also, to some extent reflect
the market analytical skills and the bargaining competence of the three export
countries. Since the natural gas from the three exporting countries is landed at
different locations in Germany, part of the discrepancies in border prices might
also be justified by differences in tariffs for domestic German transportation. Yet
another potential explanatory factor is differences in the seller’s bargaining posi-
tion. The more patient player often strikes the better deal. Norway and the
Netherlandsboth with a healthy financial situationmight have had a strategic
advantage relative to Russia that was in need of hard currency. The need for
foreign exchange and the long pipelines may have made Russia vulnerable to price
discrimination by a monopsonistic gas consortium. The price formulas specify a
non-linear price structure for natural gas imports to Germany. Our empirical tests
below indicate that the price differences from the three sources of supply are
found in the basis price of the price formula. This supports the hypothesis that
price differences are due to time invariant differences in supply elasticities among
Ž .the suppliers, with the country with the highest elasticity Russia receiving the
lowest price. Having similar escalation terms for the three suppliers, though, the
gas prices follow the same time pattern, i.e. the gas market is integrated.17
6. Concluding remarks
Examining beach prices of natural gas delivered to Germany from Russia,
Norway and the Netherlands in the period 19901998, we find primarily differ-
ences in mean prices between the three suppliers. Cointegration tests show that the
different beach prices for gas to Germany move proportionally over time, indicat-
ing an integrated gas market. In other words, the Law of One Price holds. The
most plausible explanation to the difference in the basis pricethe fixed term of
the long term take-or-pay contracts, is that longer transport distances, is making it
17 Ž .For a presentation of price discrimination and optimal nonlinear pricing, see Wilson 1993 .
Ž .much more expensive to offer value-generating volume flexibility swing serices
for the Russians and to some extent the Norwegians, since this would require
excess capacity in the pipelines. This fact may explain our finding that Dutch gas is
the most expensive gas, and that Norwegian gas is higher priced than Russian gas.
Dutch gas contracts are known to specify highest volume flexibility. Norway has a
fair swing component, whereas the Russians deliver the base load with a limited
amount of swing. This seems to be a rational economic solution; swing services are
supplied from the cheapest source, and suppliers with a long transport route have a
considerably higher capacity utilization in the pipelines.
In the initial phases of gas extraction in Russia, The Netherlands and Norway,
the oil companies had to undertake large irreversible investments in extraction,
processing, and transportation facilities. To secure a return on their investments,
they required long term gas export contracts. This was acceptable by the buyers.
Being regional or national monopolies, they operated in a stable environment.
Focus was on security of supply of energy, i.e. avoidance of technical and political
risk. Due to the latter, the buyers adapted a policy of buying gas from several
sources. This is a possible supplementary explanation to our findings that Russian
gas in the 1990s was sold at prices systematically lower than the price of Dutch and
Norwegian gas. However, there were capacity constraints in Russian gas extraction,
and Norwegian gas exports were at any rate needed to satisfy the increasing
demand at the Continent.
Gas sales contracts to Germany from the three export countries were entered
into at different points of time. Price differences may thus partly reflect differences
in price expectations in different time periods. Yet another potential explanatory
factor is differences in the seller’s bargaining position. The more patient player
often strikes the better deal. Norway and the Netherlandswith a healthy finan-
cial situationmight have had a strategic advantage relative to Russia that was in
need of hard currency. Lower prices on Russian gas may thus be the result of a
rational price discrimination policy on behalf of the monopsonistic import consor-
tium, exploiting the higher Russian supply elasticities.
Assessing the take-or-pay contracts, it is evident that they represent a com-
promise between the seller’s and the buyer’s objectives with respect to volume
guarantees and flexibility. As for price risk, the fixed term in the contracts implies
stability for the seller, whereas the escalation terms in the price formulalinking
gas prices to the price of substitutesimply that the seller is carrying a price risk.
The German gas import prices have in the period displayed a considerable
volatility, indicating that the producers are carrying a substantial part of the price
risk.18 According to contract and incentive theory, optimal contract design implies
sharing the risk among the contracting parties according to their ability to carry
Ž . Ž .risk i.e. according to their risk aversion , see general analyses by Laffont 1989
Ž .and Salanie 1998 , and applications in the petroleum industry by Osmundsen´
18 This indicates that the actual price formulas in the contracts exhibit high impact factors.
Ž .1999 . Thus, the risk sharing in the gas supply contracts is in accordance with
theoretical recommendations only to the extent that the buyer’s commercial
activity is highly sensitive to inter-fuel competition.
The European gas market is now changing. A spot market is established in the
UK, and the Interconnector pipeline connects the gas markets in the UK and the
Continent. The simultaneous existence of several types of contractslong-term
contracts linked to oil prices on the Continent, long-term UK contracts linked to
gas spot prices, and the spot market exchange in the UKraises a number of
interesting questions. At the same time the EU Gas Directive opens up for
negotiated third party access to pipelines. However, gas market reform may be a
slow process.
The margins for the transmission and distribution companies are likely to
decline over time, as competition is introduced. The effect on the producer prices,
however, is uncertain. These changes are primarily affecting the distribution
system. The suppliers are the same, and they have huge long-term contracts to
defend. Thus, they will be hesitant to trigger a price war, and they may be reluctant
to stimulate spot trading that may undermine their vested interests in the long-term
take-or-pay contracts.
With more pipelines being built, and with emerging negotiated third party
access, the European gas customers will have access to more sources of gas supply.
Thus, the emphasis on security of supply is likely to be reduced. However, the basic
sources of supplythe producer countriesare not to be changed. Notably, there
is currently demand for Norwegian gas from Italy and Spain. Transport costs are
lower from Algeria, but buyers prefer to have multiple sources of supply. A denser
pipeline grid and the introduction of new gas buyers, make it more difficult to
enforce effective price discrimination. However, alternative supply routes that
involve transit through many countries may involve substantial transport tariffs.
Market developments are also likely to lead to demand for contracts of shorter
duration. For new contracts this will be manageable for the exporters at this stage.
Becoming more mature producers, they may in many development projects be able
to make use of existing processing and transport facilities. Mature extraction areas
often also involve smaller fields with a shorter extraction period. The reduction in
investments and extraction time reduces the producers’ need for long-term volume
commitments from the buyers.
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